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ABSTRACT 
This study differs from prior audit pricing-studies as 1) it focuses on the issue of price competition 
in the (small) private client segment of the audit market, and 2) addresses the question whether and 
how  the  aUdit-pricing model changed in  that market between 1989-1997.  Given the significant 
increases in market concentration and two big audit-fIrm mergers in that period, we try to assess 
whether price competition (market power) has increased (decreased) or decreased (increased). We 
use Belgian data on privately owned companies from 1989 and 1997 for our analyses. We fmd that 
audit fees are significantly associated with the incumbent auditor's market share both in 1989 and 
1997. Our results are in line with prior studies on public client samples and hence do not support 
prior assumptions (see, for example, Simunic 1980) that there are no price premia charged by large 
auditors  in the  small-client  segment of the  audit market.  It  is  however not clear whether  the 
reported price premium is due to market power or differentiated audit quality. As to the evolution 
of audit pricing in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market between 1989 and 1997, 
we fmd that the impact of various audit-fee determinants changed signifIcantly and report evidence 
supportive of increased price competition. 
KEy WORDS: Price competition, audit pricmg, market concentration, private companies. 
2 1. INTRODUCTION 
Many studies have addressed  aUdit-pricing  issues  in  the  past.  Early  aUdit-pricing  research  was 
inspired by concerns about price competition in the audit market as  a result of the high levels of 
supplier concentration. The question whether audit markets are price competitive remained valid in 
the nineties, especially as  the consolidation trend between the big international accounting fIrms 
had continued. The vast majority of audit-pricing studies focuses  on the public-client segment of 
the  audit  market and  reports  evidence  consistent with  price  competition  in  that  market.  Price 
premia are reported for big 8/6 fIrms,  but these are explained as evidence supportive of quality-
differentiated services, rather than arguments against price competition. 
This study differs from prior studies and contributes to audit pricing research in at least two 
respects. First, we focus on the question of price competition in the (smaIl) private client segment 
of the audit market. In prior studies, one often assumes that price competition prevails in the smaIl 
client segment of the audit market because of its low concentration (see, for example,  Simunic 
1980). However, to our knowledge this assumption has never been directly tested. Second, given 
the  significant  increases  in  market  concentration  and  two  big audit-finn mergersi  in  the  late 
eighties, we address the question whether and how the audit-pricing model changed in that market 
during the last decade of the fonner millennium. The mergers and the increase in concentration 
may have changed the market position and power of the players in the audit market, and there is a 
general concern that the  degree of competition may have dropped.  However,  audit practitioners 
typically  claim  that  the  increased  concentration  has  increased  rather  than  decreased  price 
competition. Prior aUdit-pricing studies based on samples of public clients indeed report evidence 
that is supportive of increased price competition. Menon and Williams (2001) report flat (and not 
increased)  audit  fees  during  the  nineties.  Pearson  and  Trompeter  (1994)  report  a  negative 
association between audit fees  and the level of supplier concentration. The validity of the latter 
study is, however, limited as only the insurance industry was included in the sample. Furthennore, 
the sample only covered a relatively short time period in which concentration ratios exhibited only 
limited variablity. In our study we report a signifIcant increase in concentration in the Belgian audit 
3 market between 1989 and 1997. We then assess whether the audit pricing model changed over that 
time  period  and  whether  detected  changes  are  consistent  with  increased  price  competition  or 
increased market power. 
We use Belgian data from 1989  and  1997 for our analyses,  as the vast majority of the 
clients in the Belgian audit market are privately owned companies with an average size (namely 
about 2 billion Belgian Francs or 50 million Euro) that is  small compared to other industrialized 
countries. We chose to adopt these two years because 1989 data are still unaffected by the two 
megamergers that took place in that year,  and  1997  data should already fully  incorporate their 
effect. We propose a new surrogate to assess market concentration based on persounel cost data per 
audit firm. To this end, we collected all financial statements submitted by Belgian audit firms to the 
Belgian National Bank in  those  two  years.  We  adopt  a  measure  proposed in  the  literature  of 
industrial organization (see Parker, 1991) to assess whether supplier concentration is significant in 
the Belgian audit market and fmd that this is not the case, both in 1989 and 1997. We do however 
fmd that the increase in concentration between 1989 and 1997 is significant. 
To address our research questions, namely whether 1) audit pricing is competitive in the 
private client segment of the Belgian audit market and 2) the audit-pricing model changed between 
1989 and 1997, we had to  collect audit-fee information through surveys as fees  are not publicly 
disclosed in  Belgium.  We fmd  that  audit  fees  are  significanlty  associated  with  the  incumbent 
auditor's market share both in 1989 and 1997. Our results are in line with prior studies on public 
client samples and hence do not support prior assumptions that there are no price premia charged in 
the small (non-concentrated) client segment of the audit market. We also find evidence supportive 
of an increase in price competition in 1997 compared to 1989. In particular, we tested whether the 
impact of various audit fee determinants changed significantly between 1989 and 1997. To that end 
we used Chow tests. 
The remainder of this  paper is  organized  as  follows.  In the  next section we  provide  a 
literature review. In Section 3, we describe those characteristics of the Belgian audit environment 
that are relevant to this study. We also provide evidence on  supplier concentration in the Belgian 
4 audit market and assess its significance. We then specify our research questions in Section 4. In 
Section 5 we define the audit-fee model that we will adopt and describe our research design. We 
then discuss our sample selection procedures and the main results of our analysis in Section 6. 
Finally, we present our conclusions L1! Se-etion 7. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Audit market concentration studies 
Ample empirical evidence has been published on audit market concentration2• These studies were 
inspired by concerns about the possible anti-competitive effect of the presence of a few dominant 
players (Le. the big 8/6 accounting firms) in the audit market and the mergers between some of the 
big 8 firms. Early studies stem from the public client segment of  the U.S. audit market, and include 
Zeff and Fossum (1967), Rhode et al. (1974), Schiff and Fried (1976), and Dopuch and Simunic 
(1980). Concentration ratios reported in these studies range (depending on the surrogate used for 
fees)  from  abont  65-70%  for  the  CR4  to  as  high  as  95-98%  for  the  CR8.  Several  studies 
questioned the contention that high market concentration was the result of lack of competition, and 
report (sometimes weak) evidence supportive of price competition (see, for example, Dopuch and 
Simunic, 1980; Campbell and McNiel, 1985; Danos and Eichenseher, 1986). 
The megamergers between some of the largest big 8 firms in 1989 were a reason why 
audit market concentration studies have continued in the nineties. Again, there was a great concern 
of possible monopoly power and/or loss  of objectivity and independence as  ouly  a few firms 
dominated the audit market. Minyard and Tabor (1991) and Tonge and Wootton (1991) examined 
the proforma impact of the big 8 mergers of 1989. Both studies predicted that the mergers would 
have little impact on competition and could actually increase competition in the audit industry. 
Wootton et al. (1994) even indicate that although those mergers resulted in increased concentration 
ratios, the analysis suggests that the industry is becoming better balanced in competition within the 
5 group of big audit firms. An important consequence is also the much bigger gap between the rust 
tier audit firms and the other (smaller) audit firms in the market. 
As to European evidence, audit market concentration studies were performed in various 
national audit markets (see, for example, Moizer and Turley, 1987; Christiansen and Loft, 1992; 
Buijink and Maijoor, 1993; Loft and Sjiifors, 1993; Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; Corona Romero et 
al.,  1995;  Marten,  1996;  Weets and  Jegers,  1997;  Pong,  1999).  Although  the  level of market 
concentration differs  between  European  countries,  an  increase  in  the  eighties  and nineties  is 
apparant in most countries. Interesting is that some studies report a significant difference in big 6 
market shares depending on the client segment. For example, Pong (1999) reports for the U.K. 
market that the big 6 market share ranged from about 50% in the small size client segment to 98% 
in the largest client segment of the UK audit market. As  to Belgium, Weets and Jegers  (1997) 
report that concentration ratios are lower than in most other industrialized countries, but also that 
there is an increasing trend in big 8/6 market shares in the Belgian audit market during the 80s and 
90s. A further discussion of audit market concentration in Belgium as compared to other countries 
follows in the next section (See also Tables 1 and 2 which are discussed later on). 
Audit fee studies 
Based on the empirical evidence of high supplier concentration in the audit market, early audit fee 
research was mainly inspired by  concerns  about price competition in the audit market.  In  his 
seminal paper, Simunic (1980) proposed a model of audit pricing to test for competition in the US 
audit industry. He assumed that price competition prevails in the small auditee market segment 
because of the lower supplier concentration in this segment, but that the large auditee market may 
not be  competitive because of big  8  concentration.  By comparing  pricing in the  two  market 
segments, Simunic draws conclusions about competition in the audit market. From the results of 
his study the hypothesis that the audit market is competitive could not be rejected, as no significant 
premia were found for big 8 rrrms  in the large client segment of the market. Many subsequent 
studies  adopted  a  similar  approach  to  study  audit  pricing  (see,  for  example,  Francis,  1984; 
6 Palmrose, 1986a and 1986b; Francis and Simon, 1987; Ettredge and Greenberg, 1990; Pong and 
Whittington,  1994; Lee,  1996 and DeFond et al.,  2000). Unlike Simunic, most studies report a 
significant big 8/6 audit fee premium and explain this finding by product differentiation by the big 
explained by size differences in the client samples under investigation. 
Later audit fee studies (see, for example, Pearson et al., 1994; Craswell et al., 1995; Deis 
et al., 1996; and DeFond et al., 2000) were mainly concerned with specific determinants of audit 
fees,  such  as  the  effect  of  auditor  switching,  auditor  concentration  and  auditor  industry 
specialization. 
Fees studies have also been done outside the U.S. For example, Francis (1984), Francis and 
Stokes (1986), Craswell et al. (1995) report evidence on the Australian market; Chan et al. (1993), 
Pong and Whittington (1994), Taffler and Rarnalinggam (1982) on the UK market; Firth (1985) on 
the New Zealand market; Anderson and Zeghal (1994) on the Canadian market; and Chung and 
Lindsay (1988), Dominica Suk-yee Lee (1996), Gul (1999) and DeFond et al. (2000) on the Hong 
Kong market. Overall, we can conclude that: 1) a fairly robust audit fee model seems to explain 
50%-70% of  audit fee variations across the world, including auditee size, client complexity and 
riskiness as explanatory variables, and 2) significant price premia for big 5/6 finns are observed 
worldwide. Note that almost all prior audit fee studies used samples of  public clients. 
Long-Term trends in audit fees 
In a recent study, Menon and Williams (2001) report evidence on long-term trends in audit fees in 
the US audit market. They find that fees  increased in the 1980s but stayed flat in the 1990s. In 
particular,  a  significant  increase  in fees  is  noted  in  1988,  which  the  authors  attribute  to  an 
expansion of audit effort as a response  to the issuance of the expectations gap standards. The 
evidence also indicates a short-term but not a long-term effect of the big 8 mergers in 1989 on 
audit pricing. Some changes in the audit fee model over the sample period (1980-1997) are also 
documented. For example, the magnitude of the coefficients for accounts receivable and inventory 
7 have declined which can be atributed to audit productivity improvements. Important to note is that 
the sample in the study was restricted to clients of big 6 firms that voluntarily disclosed audit fees 
in the period 1980-1997. This implies that no evidence is obtained on the non-big 6 client segment 
of the market, nor on the privately held firm segment of  the audit market. 
Audit pricing and supp6er concentration 
Although  both audit  fee  and supplier concentration  studies  were  inspired  by concerns  about 
competition in the audit market as a result from increased supplier concentration, both literatures 
have  developed quite separately and the relationship between supplier concentration and audit 
pricing has hardly been tested directly.  An exception is the  study by Pearson and Trompeter 
(1994). They investigate the effect of supplier concentration on audit fees for the life and health 
insurance  and property  and casualty  insurance  industries  in the  U.S  over a  four-year  period 
(namely, 1983-1986). They found that concentration is negatively associated with fees, suggesting 
that higher levels of concentration be related to higher levels of price competition. This finding is 
interesting as it does not confirm prior concerns that supplier concentration may increase market 
power of big 8/6 firms and hence affect audit pricing in a positive way. There are however two 
limitations to this study. First, as only two U.S. industries are examined, the external Validity of 
the study may be limited. Second, the sample period covers a relatively short time period during 
which the concentration ratios exhibited only limited variability in each industry.  In our study, we 
try to address some of these limitations, and investigate (for the private client segment of the audit 
market) whether the audit pricing model changed over a period (i.e. 1989 and 1997) in which two 
mergers  between  big  8  firms  occurred  and  concentration  in  the  audit  market  increased 
significantly. 
8 3. THE BELGIAN AUDIT MARKET 
Audit Demand, Supply and Production Regulations in Belgium 
Audit  demand,  supply  and  production  is  heavily  regulated  in  Belgium.  In this  subsection  we 
discuss regulations that may affect the competitiveness of the Belgian audit market.  Unlike the 
situation in the U.S., demand for audit services is not voluntary for many privately held companies 
in Belgium. The Act of 21  February 1985 prescribes that both public and private limited liability 
companies of a certain size are required to have their annual financial statements audited by a 
licensed  statutory  auditor.  These  size  criteria3  are  not all  that  large  which  implies  that many 
relatively small companies are legally required to appoint a statutory auditor. We believe that one 
consequence is that actual demand is larger than what it would be if it were free and solely based 
on economic motivations. Demand regulation for privately held firms probably also has an impact 
on  auditor choice decisions. As there may  be little or no need for auditing based on economic 
grounds, relatively small private companies with few agency problems may opt for the cheapest 
audit possible in order to fulfill legal requirements. This may explain why the seller concentration 
ratios are smaller in Belgium than in other legal environments (see next subsection). As large audit 
fmns tend to be more expensive, smaIl companies will not acquire services from these audit firms. 
Audit supply is also regulated in Belgium. Meeuwissen and Maijoor (1997) reviewed and 
compared audit supply regulations that can be expected to have a direct impact on competition in 
three national audit markets, namely Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. They conclude that 
Belgium and Germany are less liberal than the Netherlands in terms of audit market regulations, 
and that therefore the Belgian and German audit markets can be expected to be less competitive 
than the Dutch. We will give a short overview of various aspects of audit supply that are regulated 
in Belgium and  which  may  affect  competition  in  the  Belgian  audit  market.  First,  there  is  a 
limitation as to who can offer the statutory audit service4. Since the Act of 21 February 1985, only 
members of the IRElIBR are entitled to conduct statutory audits. This implies that the amount of 
potential suppliers of statutory audits is  much smaller in Belgium compared to  countries where 
9 such a  restriction does  not exisr. Second,  the  admission  to  the  audit profession  is  regulated 
through the Royal Decree of 13 October 19876• Third, there are some regulations with respect to 
the auditor's appointment. These include prohibition of sollicition and restrictions on advertising. 
Note that advertising roles have become less  stringent in  the nineties, but sollicitation  is  still 
forbidden.  Only factual  and objective  advertising on a  local  scale  is  permitted.  Furthermore, 
statutory auditors are formally appointed by the general assemby of shareholders for a period of 
three years. Fourth, the code of professional ethics is incorporated in the law by the Royal Decree 
of 10 January 1994. The most important part in the code of ethics concerns auditor independence. 
Interesting to note is that the Belgian independence rules prohibit auditors to be employed outside 
the  auditing profession7•  Finally,  it is  relevant to note that  only  since the early  nineties big 
international accounting firms began to operate under their own brandname in Belgium. Before 
they  operated  through  local  partnerships  because  the  use  of international  brandnames  was 
forbidden. 
As to audit production, there are also regulations that may affect the Belgian audit market. 
Auditing standards obviously affect the production of  audit services and in Belgium they are set by 
the Belgian Institute of Auditors (mRlIRE). Of further relevance is that the Institute of Auditors 
also  has  a  legal role  in monitoring the competitive structure of the Belgian audit market by 
monitoring the pricing practices of  its members. It is believed that fierce price competition would 
have a negative impact on auditor performance and audit quality, and therefore every auditor who 
is a member of the Institute is required to report to the Institute the number of hours spent on all 
engagements and the corresponding audit fees charged. The Institute then reviews the adequacy of 
the audit fees charged and the audit hours worked by Belgian auditors to safeguard audit quality. 
Evidence on Supplier Concentration in the Belgian Audit Market: 1989-1997 
Supplier concentration in the Belgian audit market is best measured using audit fee data. As in 
many  other countries,  however,  audit  fee  data are  not publicly  available in Belgium and  we 
therefore report audit market concentration data based on various surrogates8•  Table 1 includes 
10 CR4, CR6, CR8 ratios and the Herfindahl index for the Belgian audit market, and is based on the 
results from a study by Weets and Jegers (1997)9 for the years  1989 through  1994/1995, and our 
own assessments for the years 1989 and 1997 as these years are relevant to the empirical analysis 
further  L.'1  our  study.  We believe that  our own assessments are  pa...rtJcular!y  relevant  as  they  are 
based on auditor data instead of client data. The surrogates we used are:  1) the number of qualified 
professionals per audit firm (as in Weets and Jegers, 1997), and 2) the personnel cost per audit firm 
as reported in the fmancial statements of the audit firm. To assess the concentration ratios based on 
the second surrogate, we had to collect all financial statements submitted by Belgian audit firms to 
the Belgian National Bank  for  the  years  1989  and  1997.  From those fmancial  statements  we 
obtained the personnel cost and used it to compute the respective concentration ratios (CR4, CR6, 
CR8 and HHI). Since only limited liability companies that hit certain size thresholds have to submit 
fmancial statements to the Belgian National Bank, our sample did not include the smallest audit 
suppliers in BelgiumlO• From inspection of Table 1 it is clear that market concentration gradually 
increased between 1989 and 1997. 
[Insert Table I and Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 provides an overview of concentration ratios in several European countries and the 
U.S., based on various surrogates. From inspection of Table 2, it looks like supplier concentration 
is much smaller in Belgium than in many other countries, such as the Netherlands, the U.K., the 
U.S., Germany and Spain. Only Denmark and Sweden have concentration ratios comparable to the 
low levels reported for Belgium. One needs to keep in mind, though, that most measures in other 
countries were based on samples of public firms, whereas the Belgian measures were based on the 
1300 largest (also non-public) firmsll. Another interesting feature from both Tables I and 2 is that 
supplier concentration tends to increase in all countries during the nineties (including Belgium). 
A qualitative interpretation of the size of concentration ratios per se does not provide strong 
evidence.  Therefore  we  execute  some  further  tests  to  assess  an  anwer  to  the  following  two 
questions: First, was supplier concentration in the Belgian audit market significant, both in  1989 
11 and  1997?  And  second,  is  the  increase  in  supplier  concentration  between  1989  and  1997 
significant? To answer the fIrst question, we use a method suggested in the Industrial Organization 
literature by Parker (1991) to interpret how severely concentrated a market is. The basic idea of the 
method is to test whether a particular concentration ratio is significantly larger than a benchmark 
ratio that is being generated by a purely random allocation of market shares12• We computed such 
benchmark ratios based on the 'personnel cost' and 'number of qualified professionals' surrogates, 
both for 1989 and 1997. The results of our application of the Parker method are reported in Table 3 
and indicate that the CR4, CR6 and CR8 in our study are individually not signifIcant (at p < 5%) 
both for 1989 and 1997, as they are below the computed critical values. This evidence is consistent 
with our prior conclusion that the Belgian audit market is not very concentrated compared to other 
national audit markets. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
As  to  the  change  in  the  respective  concentration  ratio  numbers  (CR4,  CR6  and  CR8) 
between 1989 and 1997, we considered the change in the average aggregate market share of the 
biggest audit fIrms:  that is, the big 8 in 1989 and the big 6 in 1997. We then tested whether this 
change is significant by the t-test of mean differences (where the null hypothesis is that there is no 
change in the  average market  share,  and  the  alternative hypothesis  is  that  there  is  signifIcant 
increase). As there may be a concern about the normality of the data, we also executed a Wilcoxon 
rank sum test. We fonnd that the t-tests on both types of concentration ratios were signifIcant with 
p-values less than 5%, as  were the Wilcoxon testsl3• Overall, we can conclude that although the 
concentration ratios per se were not significant both in 1989 and 1997, we have evidence that the 
increase  in  supplier  concentration  in the  Belgian  audit  market  between  1989  and  1997  was 
significant. 
12 Conclusions 
ill this section we demonstrated that demand, supply and production of audit services is heavily 
regulated  in  Belgium  and  then  provided  evidence  of supplier  concentration  and  its  evolution 
between 1989 and 1997. We interpret the findings as follows. The mandatory audit requirement 
since 1985 resulted in ample audit demand by (relatively small) privately held firms, especially to 
the  benefit of local (small)  audit  suppliers.  ill addition,  audit  supply  regulations  also  seem  to 
benefit small audit suppliers. Consequently, small suppliers of the audit services held a powerful 
market  position  relative  to  the  larger  suppliers,  which  explains  the  insignificant  supplier 
concentration ratio in 1989. However, some things changed between 1989 and 1997. ill 1989, the 
Big 8 had not yet merged into the big 6(5) and they were operating under local brandnames in the 
Belgian audit market. By 1997 two big 8 mergers had taken place, the big 6 tmns were operating 
under their own brandname and advertising regulations were less stringent. The result was a gain 
of market power by the big 6 in the market for privately held tmns and a significant increase in 
supplier concentration between 1989 and 1997. Supplier concentration per se, however, was still 
insignificant in 1997. 
4. REsEARCH QUESTIONS 
The evidence on supplier concentration presented above raises at least two interesting research 
questions about audit pricing in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market. First, given 
the lower concentration ratios in that market segment, do large audit suppliers (in terms of market 
share)  charge  audit-fee premia as  is  the  case  in  the  market  segment for  publicly  held  firms? 
Second, given the significant increase in supplier concentration and two mega-mergers between 
big 8 tmns, did the audit pricing model change between 1989 and 1997? 
To answer the  first  question,  we  will  test whether market  power (proxied  by  auditor 
market share) has an impact on audit pricing, both in 1989 and 1997 (that is before and after the 
mega-mergers  that happened in  1989).  Most oligopoly  theories  predict  a positive  relationship 
between market price and seller concentration (see, for example, Weiss (1989». It is argued that in 
13 a market with a few dominant players, the likelihood of collusion and price leadership is larger. 
However, the evidence from prior audit fee research  suggests  that [1]  high  concentration may 
allow market leaders to develop expertise-related economies of scale that allow them to maintain 
relatively low fees (Danos and Eichenseher, 1982, 1986; DeFond et al., 2000), and [2] fee premia 
charged  by  big  8/6  firms  are  a  result  from  product  differentiation  rather  than  market  power 
(Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Lee, 1996). In the context of our study 
of the private client segment of the audit market, it is reasonable to expect that large audit firms 
experience more competition from local and national auditors  than they do in the public client 
segment. Hence, given the relatively low concentration ratios in the Belgian audit market, we only 
expect a signifIcant price premium should there be product differentiation by large audit firms. Our 
first research question is stated below: 
RQ 1: Is there a significant positive association between auditor market share and audit pricing in 
the private client segment of  the audit market, ceteris paribus? And is this the case in both 1989 
and 1997? 
The  second  question  we  try  to  address  is  whether  the  significant  increase  in  seller 
concentration from 1989 until 1997, which are partially due to the mergers of the big 8 into the big 
6, had any impact on the audit-pricing model. We chose 1989 as our first observation year, as it 
was the last year before the two mergers could start to have an effect on pricing practices. We 
opted for 1997 as our second observation year as it left enough time after the mergers so that a new 
'equilibrium'  pricing  model  could  be  established.  Note  that  the  time  interval  between  our  2 
observation years has to be sufficiently long as there is a fixed auditor tenure period of three years 
in Belgium. Also pricing evidence in Menon and Williams (2001) for the public client segment of 
the  U.S.  audit  market,  indicates  that  mergers  first  have an  increasing effect  on pricing which 
disappears (into a status quo) after a few years. 
To the extent that the increase in market concentration led to an increase in market power 
of the largest audit firms, we may expect an increase in audit fees charged by these firms, ceteris 
14 paribus. However, the mergers may not necessarily have led to less competition and higher prices. 
Tonge and Wootton (1991), for example, state that the merger of the smaller big 8 fInns may have 
had the effect that they have become more competitive with  the larger big 8 fIrms.  Further,  the 
sa..wne  rnay hold for mergers of non=big 6 fmns  \vith  big 6  f.LI.~. Hence two  opposite hypotheses 
with respect to audit pricing before and after the mergers are likely: an "increased market power 
hypothesis" and an "increased competition hypothesis". According to the market power hypothesis 
the increase in individual market shares of large auditors and the related increase in audit market 
concentration between 1989 and 1997 is associated with signifIcant audit price increases between 
1989  and  1997.  According to  the  increased  competition hypothesis,  the increase  in  individual 
market shares of large auditors and the related increase in audit market concentration between 1989 
and 1997 has no impact on  audit pricing between  1989 and  1997, or would be associated with 
signifIcant price decreases between 1989 and 1997. To find out which of these two hypotheses is 
empirically supported, we will to address the following research questions: 
RQ 2A: Did the audit-pricing model change between 1989 and 1997? 
RQ 2B: Did the impact of  auditor market share and other significant determinants in the audit-
pricing model change between 1989 and 1997? 
5. AUDIT FEE MODEL AND RESEARCH METHOD 
The Audit Fee Model 
To examine the effect of the market power of audit firms on audit pricing, we adopt an audit-fee 
model (see eq.  1) that is consistent with prior audit fee research (see, for example, Simunic, 1980 
and subsequent studies) and that has proven to be robust over time and countries. 
LNFEE=  a. +  ~1 POWER + ~2  LNASSET + ~3 SUB + ~4 QUICK + ~5 LTD + ~6  LOSS  +~7 
RECINV + ~8  SWITCH + ~9IAUD  + ~9  MANUF + ~  10 TRADE  (1) 
where: 
Dependent variable: 













auditor market share proxy 
natural log of  total assets (client) 
square root of the number of operating locations 
quick ratio 
long term debt divided by equity 
indicator variable (1 = experienced loss in the last 2 years, 0 otherwise) 
(account receivables + inventory)/total assets 
indicator variabie (i = engage in auditor switch within the iast 2 years, 
o  otherwise) 
indicator variable (1 = there exist internal auditor in the company, 0 otherwise) 
indicator variable (1 =  industrial sector, 0 otherwise) 
indicator variable (1 =  trade sector, 0 otherwise) 
As in other studies, we define the dependent variable as the natural log of the audit fee. As 
to the independent variables, we include POWER, the auditor's market share, as our test variable, 
and a  number of independent variables to control for cross-sectional differences  in factors  that 
affect audit fees.  Consistent with  prior research,  these control  variables  contain an  auditee-size 
variable,  a complexity variable,  risk variables  and  some other variables  that have proven to be 
significant fee determinants in prior studies. In particular, LNASSET, the natural log of total assets, 
is  the  client-size  variable,  and  SUBS,  the  square  root  of the  number  of company  operating 
locations, is our complexity variable. Our risk variables include: QUICK, the quick ratio, LTD, the 
ratio of long term debt to equity, LOSS, an indicator variable to assess whether the client reported a 
loss  during the  last two  years  or not,  and  RECINV,  the  ratio  of the  sum  of receivables  and 
inventory to total assets. Other control variables that we included are:  SWITCH to control for a 
possible low-balling effect on audit fees in case of a frrst audit engagement; lAUD to control for 
existence of internal audit, and two industry variables MANUF and TRADE to capture possible 
industry effects on the audit fee.  For an  overview  of the predicted signs  on coefficients of all 
independent  variables  we  refer  to  Table  5.  These  signs  are  consistent  with  expectations  and 
findings in prior studies. 
Research Method 
To address RQ 1, whether market power affected audit pricing in the private client segment of the 
audit market in resp.  1989  and  1997,  we  ran  the regression  model  in eq.  1 separately  for  our 
respective  samples  of 1989  and  1997  data.  For each period  we  then  assessed  the  sign  of the 
16 coefficient on our test variable 'POWER'. We defined POWER as the incumbent auditor's market 
share,  measured by  a proxy based on  that auditor's personnel  cost relative to  the  whole audit 
market, that is: 
POWER 
Incumbent audit firm's personnel cost as reported in its financial statements 
Sum of personnel cost reported by all audit fInns in the audit market 
Audit fInn personnel cost data were collected both for  1989  and  1997.  Note  that,  unlike prior 
studies, we did not defme market power by the  BIG8/6 variable to capture the impact of auditor 
size on audit fees, but include an assessment of the incumbent auditor's market share as it enables 
us to assess the impact of an individual auditor's market power on fees instead of the impact of (the 
market power of) a group of auditors (i.e. Big8/6). However, our sensitivity tests include an audit 
fee model that contains the BIG8/6 variable instead of the POWER variable, as  well a model that 
contains an alternative market share proxy based on the number of qualifIed professionals per audit 
firms (see the section on 'sensitivity checks'). 
To answer RQ 2A and RQ 2B, resp. whether the audit pricing model in 1997 is different 
from that in 1989 and whether the impact of market power and other fee detenninants on pricing 
has changed, we adopt the approach developed in Chow (1960). The Chow paper is devoted to a 
systematic treatment of tests of equality between sets of coefficients in two linear regressions. By 
adopting the approach in Chow one is able to assess whether 1) a linear relationship, andlor 2) parts 
of that relationship remain stable over time. Statistically, this implies testing respectively whether 
1) two sets of observations can be regarded as belonging to the same regression model (that is, the 
full set of coefficients is the same) andlor 2)  subsets of coefficients in two regressions are equal 
(that is, only a subset of  coefficients is the same). 
17 6. SAMPLE SELECTION AND REsULTS 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
As audit fee data are not publicly available in Belgium, we needed to collect our 1989 and  1997 
data by sending questionnaires to audit clients. In 1991 we constructed a data base of audit fee data 
based on a questionnaire sent to a random sample of 300 privately owned Belgian finDS.  The aim 
was to gain information for the year 1989 on the statutory auditor that had been appointed, the audit 
fee that had been paid and other non-publicly available information that is necessary to estimate the 
the audit fee model specifIed in eq.  1 (such as the number of operating locations, the number of 
subsidiaries, number of years of auditor tenure, and the presence of an internal audit function). In 
1999  we collected more  fee  data for  the  year  1997  and  randomly  selected  600  privately held 
Belgian finns, asking the same (and some additional) questions. We received respectively 81  and 
128  responses  of the  1989 and  1997  questionnaires.  We completed our data set with  financial 
statement  infonnation  from  the  Cd-Rom  of the  Belgian  National  Bank.  Finally,  we  deleted 
observations with missing values and extreme outliers from both samples, and retained resp. 59 and 
93 useful observation sets for 1989 and 1997. 
Since we are comparing data from two different time periods, we needed to make price-
level adjustments in order to exclude price-level effects from our analysis. Therefore, we express 
all continuous variables in our 1997 data set in 1989-prices. To that end, we used the production 
price  index  as  reported by the  'Financieel Economische Tijd',  'the' leading Belgian  economic 
journal. 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for both samples  (n1989 = 59;  nl997 = 93) and the 
popUlation  (N1997  =  8344)14  from which the samples are drawn. The average audit fee  (in  1989 
prices)  was  636  thousands  Belgian  Franks  (BEF)15  in  1989  and  351  thousands  BEF  in  1997 
(adjusted to 1989 prices). In our 1989 data set, only 33.3% were big 8 clients, whereas 48.5% of 
1997 clients were audited by a big 6 auditor. This increase is consistent with the increase in seller 
concentration  in  the  Belgian  audit  market  reported  above.  The  average  sizes  of the  client 
18 companies in both samples are resp. 4.7 billion BEF and 0.77 billion BEF for 1989 and 1997. The 
1997 sample thus includes smaller fIrms. As to the fmancial health of the companies in our sample, 
the differences between the two sample years are not large as the mean values for LOSS, QUICK 
and  LTD are  within the  S3-1!le  order of rn~gnitude. The percentage  of companies  wit..lt  an  L"lternal 
audit department is also similar bewteen the two samples. As  to RECINV there is  a difference 
between the two samples. Comparison between the sample and population averages for 1997 shows 
that companies in the sample are smaller, less levered and have less inventories and receivables. 
The quick ratio in the sample and for the population are within the same order of magnitude. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Results of the audit fee regression model for 1989 and 1997 (RQ 1) 
To answer the question whether there is a significant positive association between auditor market 
share and audit pricing in the Belgian market for audit services, and whether this is the case both in 
1989 and 1997, we discuss the results of the regressions we ran both on our 1989 and 1997 
samples. These results are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The audit fee model as specifIed in eq. 1 was highly signifIcant both in 1989 and 1997 (p < 0.0001 
for both years); it explained 67 % of variation in audit fees in  1989 but only 39 % in 1997. This 
decrease in explanatory power of the audit fee model indicates that other determinants may have 
become relevant and this  the pricing model  may have changed between  1989  and 199i6•  No 
multicollinearity  nor  heteroscedasticity  problems  were  identified  (a  correlation  matrix  of 
independent variables for both years is provided in Appendix 1). 
From Table  5  it is  also  clear that  our  test  variable,  POWER,  is  positive  and highly 
signifIcant both in 1989 and 1997 (p = 0.0077 and p = 0.0001 resp.). This implies that audit firms 
were able to charge higher audit fees the larger their market share, ceteris paribus. Our test does not 
19 indicate whether this is due to market power or product differentiation. Since we are analyzing the 
private client segment of the audit market, which is characterized by relatively small concentration 
ratios, one would expect that competition would pre-empt audit firms from charging price premia, 
unless for differentiated products. Somehow remarkable, however, is that the impact of POWER on 
the audit fee decreased between 1989 and 1997, a period in which supplier concentration increased 
significantly in Belgium. The coefficient on POWER dropped from 5.0774 to 3.9186. This implies 
that an increase in POWER by 1  % resulted in a audit fee increase of 159% in 1989 but only 49 % 
in  1997.  Apparently the increase in seller concentration did not lead to an increased impact of 
POWER  on  fees  which  indicates  that  competition  between  audit  firms  rather  increased  than 
decreased between 1989 and  1997. This  result is consistent with prior research fmdings  in  the 
public client segment (see, for example, Wootton et al., 1994) that increased market concentration 
increases rather than decreases competition between audit firms. 
As  to  the  control  variables  in  the  model,  in  1989  LNASSETS  and  SWITCH  were 
significant at p < 0.01, SUBS at p < 0.05 and QUICK at p < 0.10. All the other variables were not 
significant. In 1997 only LNASSETS remained significant at p < om and SUBS at p < 0.05. Both 
QUICK and SWITCH lost significance, but TRADE became weakly significant (p < 0.10). 
Prior  studies in  the public  client segment  of the  audit  market  have reported  evidence 
supportive of low balling, with a significant negative coefficient on auditor switching variables. 
Competition among audit suppliers has  been put forward as  the explanation for the low-balling 
phenomenon. An interesting result of this study is that we find a positive sign of the coefficient on 
SWITCH (both in 1989 and 1997, however only significant in 1989). This result remains robust 
across alternative fee models that we ran (see further under 'senstivity checks'), and may indicate a 
lack  of competition  in  the  Belgian  audit  market,  especially  in  1989.  Obviously  initial  audit 
engagements require more effort and hence are more costly to perform. With little competition, 
audit firms are able to  price the additional initial engagement costs through to their new clients, 
which  explains  the  positive  coefficient  on  the  SWITCH  variable.  The  fact  that  the  positive 
coefficient drops from 0.7478 to 0.1046 between 1989 and 1997, and loses its significance, adds 
20 also more evidence to our fmding that competition in the audit market increased by 1997, and that 
the ability to price initial engagement costs through disappeared. 
Changes in the audit fee model between 1989 and 1997: Results of the Chow tests (RQ 2A and 
2B) 
Table 617 presents the results of the Chow tests we ran on the entire linear fee regression model as 
represented in eq.  1,  and on the separate fee parameters. Our main question is whether the audit 
pricing model has changed between 1989 and 1997, both as a whole and its individual components. 
The Chow test on the 'full model' does not yield a signifcant F-ratio (p = 0.8222), which means 
that  the null hypothesis that the  model  did  not change cannot be rejected.  Note  that this  null 
hypothesis was tested against the alternative hypothesis that all parameters together do not stem 
from the same regression model. 
From inspection of Table 5 (see also the above subsection), it is clear that the individual 
impact of the separate fee determinants did change between  1989 and  1997. We therefore also 
performed Chow tests on those individual fee parameters that were significant in either 1989 or 
1997. Although the coefficient on POWER decreased from 5.0774 to 3.9186 between 1989 and 
1997,  our Chow test indicates  that this  change  was  not  significant  (p  = 0.6482).  This  is  not 
unexpected, as we learn from Table 5 that the impact of POWER on audit pricing remains very 
significant (p < 0.01) in both years. 
As to the change of impact of the other audit fee determinants between 1989 and 1997, we 
found significant results at p < 0.01 for SUB, at p < 0.05 for SWITCH and TRADE and at p < 0.10 
for LNASSETS and QUICK. The results are in line with what we already learned from Table 5. 
The significant changes in the impact of SUB and LNASSETS can be explained by changes in 
audit technology and productivity between 1989 and 1997. As the coefficients for LNASSETS and 
SUB dropped from resp. 0.4215 and 0.3008 in 1989 to 0.25 and 0.0525 in 1997, we could conclude 
that  the audit process  has  become less  labor intensive  and  hence  productivity  increased.  The 
coefficient on  QUICK significantly  increased from -0.2581  to  -0.0076  and  lost  its  significant 
impact on fees in 1997. This can be interpreted as an indication that audit firms have become more 
21 risk taking in the sense that risk is no longer priced through. A very interesting result for our study 
is the significant change in the coefficient on SWITCH, namely from 0.7478 to 0.1046. Given also 
that the impact was significant in 1989 and no longer significant in 1997, we can conclude that at 
least pricing on initial audit engagements became more competitive in 1997 than in 1989. 
Sensitivity tests 
We performed the following sensitivity checks to test the robustness of our results:  1. We re-ran 
our fee models both for 1989 and 1997 using different proxies for POWER; and 2. accordingly we 
reperformed  all  the  Chow  tests.  As  to  the  alternative  proxies  for  POWER  we  tested  two 
alternatives: an individual auditor market share based on the surrogate of the number of qualified 
professionals per audit firm, and the traditional big 8/6 variabale. We find robust results both for 
the  1989  and  1997  pricing  models,  as  significance  of the  coefficients  of  the  various  fee 
determinants was not affected. Also for corresponding Chow tests we f'md similar (robust) results. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analysed supplier concentration and pricing in the private client segment of the 
Belgian audit market in the period 1989-1997. We assessed that the Belgian audit market is heavily 
regulated, with a mandatory audit requirement for relatively small private firms and a broad set of 
regulations  that affect  audit supply  and production.  We  also  documented non-siguificant audit 
market  concentration  for  Belgium  in  1989  and  1997  which  looks  lower  than  audit  market 
concentration in most other industrialized countries. We do however report a significant increase in 
market concentration between  1989  and  1997,  and  explain  this  by  the mergers  that took place 
between two of the big 8 firms and by the abolition of some regulations that mainly protected small 
audit suppliers (for example, the big 6 were allowed to use their own brandname). 
Given our assessments of market concentration for  1989 and 1997 and the changes  that 
took place in the audit environment during that period, we  then investigated audit pricing in the 
private  client segment  of the Belgian  audit  market.  Prior  studies  mainly focused  on  the  large 
(public) client segment of the audit market and report evidence supportive of price competition 
22 with differentiated products. In such as study, Simunic (1980), assumed that pricing is competitive 
in the smaller (public) client segment of the audit market. We tried to assess whether:  1) indeed, 
pricing is competitive in the smaller-(and private) client segment of the audit market both in 1989 
3...nd  1997,  and  use  Belgian  data  for  this  assessment  and  2)  whether  the  increase  in market 
concentration between 1989 and  1997 resulted in more or less price competition. We found  that 
audit pricing is  significantly associated with  the incumbent auditor's market share  (and thus  to 
some extent his market power). This result is similar to prior results on pricing in the public client 
segment  of the  market,  and  differs  from  the  general  expectation  (assumption)  that  no  price 
premium would be associated with auditor size in the small auditee client segment of the market. 
However, it is not clear whether this finding implies that there is a lack of price competition in the 
market or whether the price premium is due to product differentiation, as assumed in many studies 
in the  public client segment.  Only if auditor size  is  associated  with quality-differentiated audit 
services, price competition prevails in private client segment of the audit market. 
We also report some interesting results as to the change in the pricing model between 1989 
and 1997. We fmd that the impact of various individual components of the audit fee model changed 
between  1989 and 1997. Interesting is that the evidence points in the direction of an increase in 
price competition. First, we frod that the impact of POWER (the auditor's market share) on pricing 
decreased between 1989 and 1997, even though this decrease was not significant. Second, we frod 
a significant change of the impact of the SWITCH variable on pricing consistent with an increase 
in price competition in the audit market for initial engagements.  Unlike prior studies  we fmd a 
positive significant coefficient for the SWITCH variable in 1989, which is a clear indication that 
the audit market was not very competitive at that time. This can be explained by the monitoring 
legal role  attributed to the Belgian Institute of Auditors that checks whether audit firms  charge 
price  that  are high  enough  to  guarantee  sufficient  quality.  By  1997,  the  results  show  a  non-
significant  and  much  smaller  positive  coefficient  on  SWITCH.  Third,  significant  changes  in 
coefficients on LNASSETS and SUB indicate that audit firms have become more productive. An 
implication could be that increased productivity enables them to become more price competitive or 
that competition has forced them to become more productive. Overall, our results are consistent 
23 with prior findings in the public client segment of the audit market that increased concentration 
does not necessarily lead to decreased price competition, but rather to increased price competition 
(see, for example, Pearson and Trompeter, 1994). 
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27 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1997 
• Personnel cost per audit fmn  47%  63% 
b No. of qualified professionals per audit firm  22%  27% 
b No. of qualified professionals per audit fmn (WI 1997)  21%  22%  31%  28%  28%  26%  26%  D.a. 
C Client sales (WI 1997)  41%  43%  52%  53%  56%  56%  n.a.  n.a. 
C Square root of client sales (WI 1997)  19%  19%  23%  21%  23%  24%  n.a.  n.a. 
C Total assets (WI 1997)  45%  48%  57%  58%  60%  61%  n.a.  D.a. 
C Number of clients (WI 1997)  33%  34%  39%  40%  42%  42%  n.a.  D.a. 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
• Personnel cost per audit firm  60%  77% 
b No. of qualified professionals per audit firm  27%  32% 
b No. of qualified professionals per audit firm (WI 1997)  25%  27%  35%  33%  33%  31%  31%  n.a. 
C Client sales (WI 1997)  53%  54%  64%  66%  69%  70%  n.a.  n.a. 
C Square root of client sales (WI 1997)  25%  26%  30%  29%  31%  31%  D.a.  n.a. 
C Total assets (WI 1997)  56%  61%  69%  71%  74%  74%  D.a.  D.a. 
C Number of clients (WI 1997)  43%  45%  53%  54%  56%  56%  D.a.  D.a .  .  - 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1997 
• Personnel cost per audit firm  68%  80% 
b No. of qualified professionals per audit firm  30%  36% 
b No. of qualified professionals per audit firm (WI 1997)  29%  31%  38%  36%  36%  35%  34%  n.a  .. 
C Client sales (WI 1997)  59%  62%  69%  70%  73%  75%  D.a.  n.a. 
C Square root of client sales (WI 1997)  30%  31%  34%  33%  35%  36%  n.a.  n.a. 
C Total assets (WI 1997)  65%  71%  76%  77%  80%  81%  n.a.  n.a. 
C Number of clients (WI 1997)  51%  53%  58%  60%  62%  62%  n.a.  n.a. 
28 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1997 
a Personnel cost per audit fIrm  0.0768  0.1184 
b No. of  qualifIed professionals per audit fum  0.0175  0.0228 
b No. of qualifIed professionals per audit fum (WI 1997)  0.0170  0.0190  0.3000  0.0250  0.0250  0.0230  0.0210  n.a. 
C Client sales (WI 1997)  0.0590  0.0620  0.0840  0.0860  0.0920  0.0940  n.a.  n.a. 
C Square root of client sales (WI 1997)  0.0180  0.0190  0.0220  0.0210  0.0220  0.0230  n.a.  n.a. 
C Total assets (WI 1997)  0.0710  0.0800  0.1080  0.1140  0.1160  0.1180  n.a.  n.a. 
C Number of clients (WI 1997)  0.0410  0.0430  0.0540  0.0560  0.0590  0.0600  n.a.  n.a. 
Notes 
a The concentration ratios based on personnel cost are based on all financial statements submitted by audit firms to the Belgian National Bank. 
b The concentration ratios based on the number of qualified professionals are based on the membership lists of the Belgian Institute of auditors (lBRlIRE). Per audit finn we traced 
the number of members that are associated with it. Note that the total population is included. 
C The concentration ratios in Weets and Jegers C'NJ 1997) were calculated using the financial statements of the 1300 largest Belgian companies that were publicly available over the 
period 1989 -1994. 
29 TABLE 2: Evidence on concentration ratios in  Euro~ean  countries 
BASIS:  CR4  CR6  CR8  HIll 
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm 
Net..1terlands  1990, entire population - Buiji.nk a..lld  59%  n.a.  n.a.  0.09 
Maijoor, 1993 
Belgium 1990, entire population - Weets and Jegers  22%  27%  31%  0.019 
1997 
Client sales 
U.S. 1988, NYSE - Tonge and Wootton 1991  72%  99%  n.a.  n.a. 
Denmark 1990, Copenhagen Stock Exchange- 71%  n.a.  80%  n.a. 
Christiansen and Loft, 1992 
Germany 1990, 200 public clients - Marten 1996  60%  72%  n.a.  0.18 
Germany 1993,200 public clients - Marten 1996  77%  90%  n.a.  0.20 
Belgium 1990, 1300 largest clients - Woots and Jegers  43%  54%  62%  0.0620 
1997 
Belgium 1993, 1300 largest clients - Woots and Jegers  56%  69%  73%  0.0920 
1997 
Square root of client sales 
U.S. 1991, NYSE AMEX OTC - Wootton et al. 1994  69%  97%  n.a.  n.a. 
Germany 1990, 200 public clients - Marten 1996  65%  75%  n.a.  0.18 
Germany 1993,200 public clients - Marten 1996  69%  80%  n.a.  0.18 
Denmark 1990, Copenhagen Stock Exchange - Loft  26%  n.a.  36%  n.a. 
and SjOfors, 1993 
Sweden 1990, Stockholm Stock Exchange - Loft and  20%  n.a.  29%  n.a. 
Sjiifors, 1993 
Belgium 1990, 1300 largest clients - Woots and Jegers  19%  26%  31%  0.0190 
1997 
Belgium 1993, 1300 largest clients - Woots and Jegers  23%  31%  35%  0.0220 
1997 
Number of  clients 
U.S. 1988 - NYSE AMEX OTC - Wootton et al. 1994  52%  83%  n.a.  n.a. 
U.S 1991 - NYSE AMEX OTC - Wootton et al. 1994  65%  89%  n.a.  n.a. 
Spain 1988, 250 large non-financial clients - Corona  84%  92%  95%  n.a. 
Romero et al. 1995 
Spain 1993, 250 large non-financial clients - Corona  73%  85%  n.a.  0.19 
Romero et aI. 1995 
UK + Ireland 1989, Public and USM clients - Beattie  45%  n.a.  68%  n.a. 
and Fearnley 1994 
UK + Ireland 1991, Public and USM clients - Beattie  59%  n.a.  79%  n.a. 
and Fearnley 1994 
Belgium 1989, 1300 largest clients - Woots and Jegers  33%  43%  51%  0.0410 
1997 
Belgium 1991, 1300 largest clients - Woots and Jegers  39%  53%  58%  0.0540 
1997 
Belgium 1993, 1300 largest clients - Woots and Jegers  42%  56%  62%  0.0590 
1997 
30 Table 3: Significance tests of  concentration ratios (after Parker, 1991#) 
Personnel Cost  Number of qualified Professionals 
1989  1997  1989  1997 
Actual  Critical  Actual  Critical  Actual  Critical  Actual  Critical 
value  value*  value  value*  value  value*  value  value* 
CR4  47.22%  55.15%  62.69%  67.12%  21.65%  42.50%  26.93%  48.44% 
CR6  59.75%  67.83%  77.36%  80.09%  26.66%  58.40%  32.25%  62.31% 
CR8  67.99%  77.20%  80.42%  88.65%  30.31%  68.04%  35.70%  71.69% 
H CRn is characterized by the following cumulative distribution function (the variable names are adapted to 
those used in this paper): 
Pr  [CR,  :s;  CR  :]= L (_1)"-' ~(jCR :  - n)"-'Q, 




CR  , 
=  the total number of fIrms in the market excluding negligible fIrms (in this paper are those with 
market share less than 0.5%) 
= number of the n largest audit fIrms in the market 
= critical concentration ratio of the n largest fIrms at level of signifIcance 0;. Below this level 
concentration is not signifIcant. 
I-a =Pr[CR, :S;CR:] 
j  = index of the summation over the range of nlCR *  < j  :::; N for integer values of  j 
1  N! 
Q, - nN-'-'(j - n),-' . (N - j)!(j - n)!n! 
*  The critical values are calculated at 0; = 5% 
For a full technical representation we refer to Parker (1991) TABLE 4 
Descriptive statistics on the test and control variables for the regression analysis 
Panel A  ]989  n/989 =  59 
Categorical variables (proportion of  dummy=]) 
SWITCH  0.2203 
LOSS  0.2203 
lAUD  0.3390 
MANUF  0.7458 
TRADE  0.2034 
BIG8  0.3729 
Continuous variables 
Mean  st.dev.  min  median  Max 
POWER  0.0430  0.0478  0.0003  0.0175  0.1725 
FEE (1000)  635  870  41  400  6,096 
In(FEE)  5.9351  1.0152  3.7197  5.9915  8.7154 
ASSETS (1000)  4,685,427  17,556,147  100,315  680,605  128,250,604 
In(ASSETS)  13.5750  1.5105  11.5161  13.4307  18.6695 
sqr(SUBS)  1.4214  0.6669  1.0000  1.0000  3.4641 
QUICK  1.0717  0.5673  0.3800  0.9200  3.1000 
LTD  0.3253  0.5871  -2.6349  0.2173  2.0729 
RECINV  0.5755  0.1933  0.1484  0.5517  0.9537 
PanelB  ]991'  n/997 = 93 
Categorical variables (proportion of  dummy=]) 
SWITCH  0.3333 
LOSS  0.2581 
lAUD  0.3226 
MANUF  0.3441 
TRADE  0.3333 
BIG 6  0.5269 
Continuous variables 
Mean  st.dev.  min  median  Max  Population 
Mean 
POWER  0.0815  0.0807  0.0000  0.0720  0.2043 
FEE (1000)  351  349  18  208  1,668  N 1997 = 8344 
In(FEE)  5.4428  0.9301  2.9096  5.3401  7.4195 
ASSETS (1000)  766,607  1,863,932  2,413  260,369  15,560,740  1,666,775 
In(ASSETS)  12.3288  1.5930  7.7888  12.4699  16.5603  12.7457 
Sqr(SUBS)  3.1634  3.9278  1.0000  1.4142  14.1421 
QUICK  1.1744  0.8206  0.0200  1.0100  4.6600  1.2641 
LTD  0.3760  2.1607  -10.6733  0.0289  14.8431  1.0025 
RECINV  0.3675  0.2150  0.0000  0.3573  0.8411  0.6212 
# All 1997 observations were deflated into 1989 prices 
32 Table 5: Regression of audit fee on test and control variables in 1989 and 1997 
1989 (0=59)  1997 (0=93) 
Variable  Predicted  Coefficient  t-stlltistic  p-llalue  Predicted  Coefficient  t-stlltistic  p-llalue 
sign  estimate  sign  estimate 
intercept  -0.5457  0.7610  0.4516  1.5437  2.096  0.0392 
POWER  ?  5.0774  2.785  0.0077 ***  ?  3.9186  3.780  0.0003 *** 
Control variables 
LN(ASSETS)  +  0.4215  6.771  0.0001 ***  +  0.2545  4.791  0.0001 *** 
SUBS  +  0.3008  2.236  0.0302 **  +  0.0525  2.448  0.01fJ~5 ** 
QUICK  -0.2581  -1.762  0.0845 *  +  -0.0076  -0.070  0.9442 
SWITCH  0.7478  3.584  0.0008 ***  0.1046  0.604  0.5477 
LTD  +  -0.2276  -1.574  0.1222  +  0.0242  0.656  0.5134 
LOSS  +  0.2627  1.309  0.1968  +  -0.1252  -0.685  0.4955 
lAUD  -0.2335  -1.174  0.2462  0.1068  0.630  0.5307 
MANUF  +/- 0.3447  0.976  0.3342  +/- 0.1192  0.648  0.5188 
TRADE  +/- 0.2955  0.762  0.4501  +/- 0.3522  1.888  0.0626* 
RECINV  +  0.0059  0.012  0.9903  +  0.2173  0.558  0.5786 
R2  0.7364  0.4639 
adj. R2  0.6747  0.3911 
F statistic  11.9360  6.3720 
p-value F test  0.0001  0.0001 
Fee premium when power increases  159%  49% 
by1% 
*,**,***  Significantatresp. IX= .10, .05, and .01, two-tailed test. 
33 Table 6a: Chow tests performed on the entire fee model and the separate parameters 
in the model 
Separated regression: 





Ep  65.2872 
POWER 
Ep,power  61.8019 
LNASSETS 
Ep,lnassets  60.3168 
SUB 
Ep,sub  65.1349 
QUICK 
Ep,quick  63.5425 
LTD 
Ep,ltd  62.7724 
SWITCH 
Ep,switch  63.8985 







F-statistic  p-value 
0.6200  0.8222 
0.2092  0.6482 
2.8716  0.0926 
7.1235  0.0086 
3.8201  0.0528 
2.2224  0.1385 
4.5586  0.0347 
5.6517  0.0189 
a :  This  table  can  be  read  as  an  ANDV  A  table.  Es  is  the  residual  of the  regression  where 
observations of 1989 and  1997  are separated;  Ep  represents the residual of the regression where 
observations of 1989 and 1997 are pooled;  Ep,t represents the residual of the regression where all 
observations of 1989 and 1997, except observation t,  are pooled. t is either: power, lnassets, sub, 
quick, ltd, switch, or trade. For a detailed discussion see Appendix 1. 
b: This column gives the sum of squares of the residuals 
c: Degrees of freedom. 
34 ApPENDIXl 
Panel A 
1989 Correlation Analysis 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients I Prob > IRI under Ho: Rho=<! I N =  59 
LN_FEE  POWER  LN_ASSET  SUBS  QUICK  SWITCH  LTD  LOSS  lAUD  MANUF  TRADE 
POWER  0.3976 
0.0014 
LN_ASSET  0.7401  0.1655 
0.0001  0.1986 
SUBS  0.4005  0.0734  0.3755 
0.0007  0.5738  0.0016 
QUICK  -0.1354  -0.0514  -0.0171  -0.0418 
0.2674  0.6917  0.8891  0.7353 
SWITCH  0.2808  0.0746  0.0110  -0.1897  0.0318 
0.0195  0.5645  0.9283  0.1212  0.7951 
LTD  -0.1330  -0.3075  0.0314  0.0794  -0.1944  -0.0463 
0.2796  0.0159  0.7995  0.5231  0.1121  0.7078 
LOSS  0.3210  0.1180  0.2447  0.2048  -0.1079  -0.0222  -0.0589 
0.0072  0.3610  0.0427  0.0940  0.3776  0.8562  0.6332 
lAUD  0.2890  0.1872  0.3551  0.0178  -0.1809  0.2328  0.0337  0.3493 
0.0168  0.1485  0.0030  0.8861  0.1398  0.0561  0.7865  0.0035 
MANUF  0.0288  0.1822  0.1236  -0.0671  0.1505  -0.1879  0.1014  0.0567  0.0469 
0.8146  0.1564  0.3116  0.5870  0.2172  0.1221  0.4107  0.6434  0.7039 
TRADE  -0.0647  -0.1790  -0.1840  0.1316  -0.1405  0.1055  -0.0686  -0.0742  -0.0997  -0.8427 
0.5974  0.1640  0.1303  0.2847  0.2494  0.3884  0.5782  0.5444  0.4185  0.0001 
RECINV  -0.1007  -0.0713  -0.3229  -0.0293  -0.1130  0.1784  -0.0483  -0.0528  -0.2708  -0.3583  0.4161 
0.4103  0.5817  0.0068  0.8126  0.3554  0.1424  0.6955  0.6667  0.0255  0.0025  0.0004 
35 PanelB 
1997  Correlation Analysis 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  /  Prob  >  JRJ  under Ho:  Rho=O  /  N  93 
LN_FEE97  POWER  LN_ASSET  SUBS  QUICK  SWITCH  LTD  LOSS  lAUD  MANUF  TRADE 
POWER  0.3626 
0.0002 
LN_ASSET  0.4116  -0.0889 
0.0001  0.3840 
SUBS  0.4241  0.2434  0.1926 
0.0001  0.0157  0.0479 
QUICK  -0.1643  0.0561  -0.3048  -0.1459 
0.0973  0.5893  0.0017  0.1415 
SWITCH  0.1264  0.1668  0.0240  -0.0292  -0.1745 
0.1968  0.1007  0.8075  0.7663  0.0780 
LTD  0.0568  0.0335  0.0172  0.0762  -0.0161  ·0.0145 
0.5648  0.7448  0.8616  0.4397  0.8726  0.8837 
LOSS  ·0.1728  ·0.1288  ·0.0511  ·0.1340  ·0.0455  0.0604  ·0.0763 
0.0765  0.2063  0.6031  0.1710  0.6481  0.5384  0.4393 
lAUD  0.1491  ·0.0238  0.0352  0.0814  0.0157  0.0160  ·0.0126  ·0.1135 
0.1290  0.8171  0.7219  0.4089  0.8756  0.8717  0.8989  0.2491 
MANUF  0.1292  0.0031  0.2576  0.1727  0.0195  ·0.0388  0.1134  ·0.0986  0.1128 
0.1867  0.9758  0.0077  0.0767  0.8452  0.6927  0.2495  0.3146  0.2520 
TRADE  0.0633  ·0.0410  ·0.1722  ·0.0654  ·0.1623  ·0.0222  ·0.1270  0.0513  0.0972  ·0.4300 
0.5194  0.6884  0.0776  0.5052  0.1015  0.8215  0.1968  0.6015  0.3239  0.0001 
RECINV  0.1265  0.1368  ·0.0830  0.0242  0.2639  0.0162  ·0.2004  ·0.1362  0.0381  0.0889  0.0106 
0.1964  0.1791  0.3978  0.8055  0.0071  0.8690  0.0404  0.1639  0.6996  0.3647  0.9146 
36 ENDNOTES 
1 Those mergers were between Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Touche Ross into Deloitte & Touche, 
and between Arthur Young and Ernst&  Whinney into Ernst & Young. 
2 We refer to Table 2 for a selected overview of the level of the concentration ratios reported in 
prior research. Note that this table only includes evidence between 1988-1997, as this is relevant to 
the period analysed in this paper. 
3 Limited liability companies are required to appoint a statutory auditor if 1) they have more than 
100 employees; or 2) they hit two of the following size thresholds: a) Total Assets> 3,125,000 
Euro, b) Turnover> 6,250,000 Euro, and 3) number of employees> 50. 
4 In general, the Belgian accounting and auditing profession is organized in two main professional 
bodies: the 'Institut des Reviseurs d'Entreprises' / 'Instituut der Bedrijfsrevisoren' (IREIlBR, 
Institute of  Auditors) and the 'Institut des Experts Comptables et conseils fiscaux' / 'Instituut der 
Accountants en Belastingconsulenten' (IEC/lAB, Institute of Chartered Accountants and Fiscal 
Advisors). Since 1985 only members of  the IRE/IBR can offer statutory audit services. 
5 In the Netherlands, for example, both certified accountants (Accountant-
Administratieconsulenten) and registered auditors (registeraccountants) are allowed to perform a 
statutory audit. 
6 The formal entry requirements include: 1) various admission requirements (such as, for example, 
holding the Belgian nationality, having a university degree, ... ),2) pass an entrance examination, 
3) go through a period of practical traineeship of at least three years, 4) pass a fmal examination. 
7 Various other specific independence rules are prescribed, including prohibitions as to 1) 
managerial positions in the client firm, 2) personal relationships with the client, 3) financial 
interests in the client company, 4) provision of non-audit services to  a client firm, and 5) 
inappropriate dependence on the audit fee of a particular client. 
8 Moizer and Turley (1987) evaluate possible surrogates for audit fee to assess the best variables to 
calculate audit market concentration, and found that client sales and the square root of client sales 
provide respectively consistent overestimates and underestimates of  concentration measures based 
upon audit fees. Note that Tomczyk and Read (1989) used audit fees to calculate audit market 
concentration for the 28 largest audit firms in the US and report that their results are consistently 
lower than those in prior studies that used proxies to calculate concentration measures. 
9 Weets and Jegers (1997) use proxies that are typically used in the literature: clients sales, square 
root of  client sales, number of clients, and total assets (clients). They also include a ratio based on 
the number of qualified professionals per audit firm. 
10 In 1989 there were: 1) 739 auditors - members of the Institute of Auditors of which 542 (that is 
73%) belonged to an audit firm; 2) 120 audit firms of which 60 (that is 50%) submitted their 
fmancial statements to the Belgian National Bank. In 1997 there were: 1) 958 auditors - members 
of the Institute of Auditors of which 768 (that is 80%) belonged to an audit firm; 2) 276 audit firms 
of which 212 (that is 77%) submitted their fmancial statements to the Belgian National Bank. 
11 However, a sound comparison is possible between the Dutch and Belgian market for the 
concentration ratios based on the number of qualified professionals per audit firm as the entire 
population was used to compute the measure in both countries. This shows that the Belgian audit 
market is by far less concentrated than the Dutch. Thus, even though regulations are stricter in 
Belgium there is less supplier concentration. One explanation for this finding is that regulation 
tends to protect the small audit supplier against the large audit supplier, and therefore the 
concentration ratios are smaller in Belgium where (especially) supplier regulation is more 
pronounced than in the Netherlands. 
12 For a full technical discusion of the method, see Parker 1991. 
37 13 One exception was the result for the concentration ratio based on number of  qualified 
profesisonals that has p-value of  6%. 
14 This population is the group of  Belgian companies that is legally required to appoint a statutory 
auditor. We could only assess this for 1997, as the data for 1989 were not available. 
IS In 1989, USD 1 '" BEF 37 and in 1997 USD 1  == BEF 33 
16 The 1997 questionnaire also asked for a number of additional infonnation items which are not 
reported in this paper, as they are not the focus of attention. These included: 1) the number of 
countries in which the client operates, 2) whether or not the company has an industrial relations 
council, 3) whether or not the audit firm's office is in Brussels (capital of Belgium), 4) whether or 
not interim audits are executed, and 5) whether or not there is an audit committee. A model 
including these items was also tested. The explantory power increased to 58% (adjusted R2) and all 
these variables were signficant at p < 5%). 
17 Note that Table 6 can be interpreted as an ANOV  A table. 
38 